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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the overlap between SEC securities
enforcement actions and private securities fraud class actions. We
begin with an overview of data concerning all SEC enforcement
actions from 1997 to 2002. We find that the volume of SEC
enforcement proceedings is relatively modest. We next examine the
scope of the recently enacted “Fair Fund” provision that authorizes
the SEC to designate civil penalties it recovers from defendants to
benefit defrauded private investors. We conclude that this provision
offers only limited potential relief for private investors. We complete
this Part of the Article with an analysis of the serious resource
limitations faced by the SEC.
The second portion of the Article contains an empirical analysis of
the determinants of SEC enforcement actions and the overlap of
private fraud suits and SEC enforcement proceedings. Using bivariate
analysis, we find that (1) private suits with parallel SEC actions settle
for significantly more than private suits without such proceedings; (2)
SEC enforcement actions target significantly smaller companies than
private actions alone; (3) private cases with parallel SEC actions take
substantially less time to settle than other private cases; and (4) private
cases with parallel SEC actions have significantly longer class periods
than other private actions. Finally, we create a model for estimating
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damages to compare settlement ratios in cases with parallel SEC
actions to those in private actions. We find that one-fourth of all the
private class action settlements occurring in suits that yield less than
10 percent of provable losses are settled for less than 2 percent of
provable losses, but that there are no private actions with parallel SEC
suits with such small settlements.
In the final Part of the Article, we conduct a multivariate
regression analysis of the determinants of when SEC enforcement
actions are filed. We find that the most highly significant determinant
of SEC actions is financial distress. Estimated losses do not appear to
be a statistically significant factor in the SEC’s decision to file these
suits.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ............................................................................................738
I.  Mechanisms to Fulfill the SEC’s Enforcement Mandate..............746
II.  SEC Recoveries on Behalf of Injured Investors...........................753
III.  The SEC as the Heroic “David” ...................................................757
IV.  Testing Suppositions and Suspicions Regarding Private Securities
Class Action Suits...........................................................................760
V.  Empirical Analysis of the Public-Private Enforcement of the
Securities Laws ...............................................................................763
Conclusion...............................................................................................777
INTRODUCTION
A public-private partnership for the enforcement of the
securities laws is now entering its eighth decade. Since the inception
of the federal securities laws, the government’s broad enforcement
authority has been complemented by private causes of action. The
Federal Securities Act of 19331 underscores the importance of full
disclosure for the public offerings of securities by conferring an
investor-friendly cause of action on those who purchase securities of
offerings whose registration statement is materially misleading.2
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
2. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, by imposing absolute liability
on the security’s issuer and liability upon certain parties who fail to establish their “due
diligence” defense if the registration statement contains a material misrepresentation, can easily
be seen as having been drafted to assure compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
Act. This compliance orientation is further underscored by the absence of requiring a
recovering plaintiff to read, rely on, or even receive the defective registration statement, except
when the plaintiff acquired the security after the issuer had released financial statements
COX.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
2003] SEC ENFORCEMENT HEURISTICS 739
When Congress returned in 1934 to complete the federal disclosure
tapestry, it created express private causes of action for misleading
reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as
part of the newly enacted continuous disclosure requirements,3
provided private recoveries for market manipulation,4 and authorized
suits on behalf of reporting companies for short-swing profits
garnered by certain insiders.5
In the second decade of the young securities laws’ lives, the
courts concluded that even the express causes of action were not
sufficient protection for investors. Beginning with Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.,6 courts recognized a range of implied private causes of
action for individuals harmed as a consequence of another’s violation
of the securities laws.7 The highpoint of this development was J.I.
Case v. Borak,8 where the Warren Court embraced the flattering, if
not romantic, vision of the plaintiff as a “private attorney general”
who provides the invaluable service of supplementing the SEC’s own
enforcement efforts.9
covering a twelve-month period that did not commence until after the registration statement
had become effective. The express cause of action in section 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1),
which authorizes rescission of securities offered in violation of the Act’s registration
requirements, similarly can be seen as designed to assure compliance with the registration
requirements. And, section 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2), as now limited to public offerings of
securities, see Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995) (defining the word “prospectus”
as used in the statute as “a document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or
controlling shareholder”), provides a cause of action against those who cannot establish that
they did not know and could not have known through the exercise of reasonable care of the
untruth of his statement. Thus, section 12(a)(2) has the indirect effect of assuring that those
involved in the distribution of a security are conversant with the information contained in the
registration statement even though the purchasing investor is not.
3. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2000) (requiring
reliance by the plaintiff and imposing liability if the defendant fails to establish that she acted in
“good faith and had no knowledge” that the filed report was materially misleading).
4. See id. § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (providing private action for certain statutorily proscribed
forms of manipulation as well as transactions proscribed in the SEC’s rules).
5. See id. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (stating, unlike other provisions authorizing private
actions, that the SEC has no authority to obtain disgorgement of short-swing profits, although it
does have authority to assure compliance with section 16(a)’s reporting provisions).
6. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
7. See id. at 800 (“[A]lthough not expressly provided for in the Statute, a remedy by civil
action to enforce [duties and liabilities created by the Act is] available to the plaintiffs.”).
8. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
9. See id. at 432 (“Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement
to SEC action.”). For the history of the private attorney general model, see generally Jeremy A.
Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179
(Winter 1998).
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The luster that the private attorney general enjoyed, however,
was short-lived. The Supreme Court’s rhetoric shifted with the tide of
judicial conservatism, so that beginning in 1975, the Court examined
questions posed by private litigation through a lens that magnified
concerns for “vexatious litigation.”10 Though private suits under the
securities laws continued to multiply,11 and thereby provided the
plaintiffs’ bar with the good life, securities class actions and their
lawyers were not favored species. Commentators questioned the
incentives that surrounded the initiation and conduct of securities
class actions.12 This pervasive cynicism led ultimately to the enactment
10. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994) (recognizing potentially negative effects on secondary actors, newer and smaller
companies, and investors themselves as a result of securities litigation); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 743 (1975) (upholding lower court’s earlier embrace of the
purchaser-seller requirement out of “fear of vexatious litigation . . . [because the absence of such
a requirement] would throw open to the trier of fact many rather hazy issues of historical fact
the proof of which depended almost entirely on oral testimony”).
11. Part of the debate that led to Congress in 1995 reforming the procedures for the
conduct of securities class actions was awareness of, and resulting concern about, the growth in
the number of securities class actions. This data was collected in the Senate and House hearings
that preceded the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See Securities Litigation
Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy
& Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (collecting testimony and evidence about the growth of
securities class actions); Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993)
[hereinafter Private Litigation Hearings] (same). The far larger concern, however, was the belief
that private suits recover very small amounts for the class and are, therefore, beneficial only to
the lawyers who prosecute the suits. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 516–17 (1991) (doubting
that merits mattered in light of the fact that in the small sample of settlements examined, almost
all appeared to settle within a reasonably tight range of 20–27 percent of the allowable
recovery); Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 742–43 (1995)
(reviewing a sample of settlements in which 23 percent of the settlements were for less than $2
million, suggesting that the suits held only a nuisance value). For a more positive view of this
data, see James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497,
499–508 (1997).
12. The classic work on this topic is John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). See generally Alexander, supra note 11,
at 516–17 (concluding that lawsuits settle for approximately the same percentage of the harm
alleged to have been suffered, and thus merits of suits appear to have little impact on the
conduct of litigation); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 229 (1983) (“[T]he
incentives today held out to the private attorney general are both inadequate and
counterproductive in terms of the social interests that private enforcement of law is intended to
serve.”); Cox, supra note 11, at 523–24 (calling for greater activism in reviewing settlements on
the part of class action courts to improve the incentives for conduct of suits); Jonathan R. Macey
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of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).13
The PSLRA’s most forceful blow to the securities class action is the
combination of the Act’s tightened pleading requirements and its bar
to discovery until the defendants’ motions to dismiss have been
resolved.14 There reforms were prompted by the classic “strike suit”
concerns that have long dominated the debate over representative
suit litigation.15
Thus, there are two very different perspectives of the role of
private suits in the enforcement of the securities laws: one perspective
enlists plaintiffs as private attorneys general, and the other
perspective paints the same plaintiffs as vexatious litigants. This
Article sheds new light on a fundamental question of the debate
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105−16 (1991)
(arguing that incentives under the current regime are too weak for optimal prosecution of
securities claims and proposing that suits be auctioned to provide greater owner-incentives to
assure better decisions regarding whether to prosecute and settle suits); Judith Resnik, Money
Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in
Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2177–90 (2000) (suggesting
methods to increase transparency in fee awards/arrangements so as to provide better
supervision of class counsel and ultimately improved results for prosecution of suits).
13. Pub. L. No. 194-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
14. Exchange Act section 21D(b)(2) provides that when scienter is required in private
securities litigation the plaintiff must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)
(2000). The bar to discovery appears in both section 27(b)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2000), and section 21D(b)(3)(B) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(3)(B).
15. The hearings that preceded the enactment of the PSLRA were filled with testimony
and studies supporting the position that securities suits commonly followed a drop of 10 percent
or more in a securities price and that most suits were settled within the boundaries of an
available, albeit small, insurance policy. See, e.g., Private Litigation Hearings, supra note 11, at
10, 12 (statement of Edward R. McCraken, President and CEO of Silicon Graphics, Inc.)
(testifying that a lawsuit was filed several weeks after Silicon Graphics, Inc.’s 10 percent drop in
stock price that resulted from the company’s lower than expected earnings); FREDERICK C.
DUNBAR & VINITA M. JUNEJA, RECENT TRENDS II: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN
SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS? 739 (noting that many settlements are around $2 million or less, the
estimated amount of insurance). Much of the rhetoric that attended the enactment of the
PSLRA was set in place by the timely article of Professor Alexander. Alexander, supra note 11.
The synthesis of these reports appears in STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SEC. OF THE COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., REPORT ON PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION 166, 321−31 (1994). For a penetrating analysis of such data, see Joel Seligman,
Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s Disimplying Private
Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 438, 448–57 (1994); see also Cox, supra note 11, at 499–508 (asserting that the amounts
used to represent recoverable damages in statistical studies are flawed by the models used to
estimate them).
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surrounding which of these two visions of the private securities class
action has more validity. We explore how important and concomitant
are private securities class action suits to the enforcement of the
securities laws. This Article also provides another useful insight on an
even broader topic: how well the SEC carries out its mission of
protecting investors through the enforcement actions it initiates. We
not only provide data comparing the profile of suits prosecuted by the
SEC with those brought by private parties, but we also analyze
whether the SEC enforcement actions appear targeted at those
violations that have caused the most significant harm to investors. We
therefore provide information useful in evaluating the conduct of
both private and public efforts against securities law violators.
Part I of this Article reviews data regarding the enforcement
procedures pursued by the SEC in carrying out its mandate of
investor protection. The data reveal that, even though the SEC’s
administrative enforcement powers were greatly augmented in 1990,
resort to its historic enforcement powers in the federal courts
continues to be an integral and numerically significant part of its
arsenal to combat financial reporting violations. Part II examines the
potential impact of the recently enacted Fair Fund provision, which
authorizes the SEC to designate that civil penalties recovered from a
defendant will be added to any sum that the defendant is required to
disgorge for the benefit of investors. We conclude that the Fair Fund
provision, although a desirable legislative development, is limited in
several different ways that will, in a good many instances, prevent it
from providing total restitution to investors harmed as consequence
of a violation. The serious resource limitations faced by the SEC are
the subject of Part III; this condition resonates with the thesis
underlying the private attorney general metaphor. Even though the
SEC has recently received an unparalleled funding increase,16 we
conclude in Part III that its resources will continue to be seriously
constrained. Part IV examines several issues that have been raised
concerning private attorneys general including whether they yield
large recoveries relative to the losses suffered by members of the
class, whether they target small vulnerable companies, and their
16. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N. ANN. REP. tbl. 17 (2002) (detailing budget estimates
and appropriations 1998−2002); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., SEC BUDGET HISTORY VS.
ACTUAL EXPENSES, at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (setting forth fifteen years of budgetary information
beginning with 1990 budget authority of about $167 million and ending with the president’s
request for 2004 of $842 million, the latter nearly double the SEC’s budget in 2001).
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correlation with SEC enforcement. In Part V, we conduct our
empirical analysis, focusing on whether there is significant overlap
between SEC enforcement actions and securities class actions, and
whether private settlements are “better” when there has been a
collateral SEC action. We also examine other differences that exist
between cases the SEC prosecutes and those pursued only by the
private attorney general. Our conclusions assess the criteria the SEC
uses to guide its decisions to undertake an enforcement action for
fraudulent reporting.
Because so much of the data and analysis in this Article focuses
on social welfare implications of how the SEC directs its enforcement
efforts, a logical threshold question, albeit one that some may
consider heretical, or simply silly, is why the SEC has an enforcement
role at all. Why did Congress not instead empower the SEC with only
rulemaking authority and the general authority to review disclosures,
leaving private parties to pursue violations of the agency’s directives?
The answer to this question can be found on many fronts.
One answer to why the SEC has enforcement authority is that of
path dependency. When Congress enacted the securities laws, class
action procedures were not as developed as they are today. The harm
of financial frauds leading up to the market collapse of the Great
Depression was seen by the New Deal Congress through its political
lens as most significantly impacting the small investor.17 There did not
then exist the experience, as there is today, with class action
procedures, not to mention a well-funded private plaintiffs’ bar, to
empower the small investor with the means not only to recoup her
losses, but also protect herself against any ongoing violations. No
assurance, therefore, existed in the contemporary legal landscape that
private suits, which had been generously provided in both the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, would provide
sufficient recompense or deterrence for those harmed by securities
violations. Hence, within the legal landscape that existed in 1933 and
1934, Congress chose a fork in the road that included both private
and public enforcement. It granted the agency the authority to
proceed administratively and judicially to address violations
committed, as well as those about to be committed, while providing
private suits in selective areas.
17. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-85 (1933) (lamenting that the 1929 market collapse reeked
havoc on thousands of individual investors who lost their life savings because they had
succumbed to the high-pressure selling efforts of those promising easy wealth).
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More significantly, numerous regulatory provisions of the
securities laws create problems that prevent the meaningful pursuit of
violations by private plaintiffs. In many cases, the loss suffered by the
plaintiff or even a group of plaintiffs may not rise to a sufficient level
to attract the interest of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorney. And,
the expected gains of the suit may be heavily discounted by both the
plaintiff and his attorney, due to problematic elements such as
establishing or even pleading key elements of the case.18 The plaintiff
may, not withstanding a clear violation, face causation or standing
requirements.19 Or, the violation may not have been discovered within
the applicable limitations period.20 It can also be the case that the
violation is simply of the type for which no private action exists. The
net capital requirements of brokers,21 the requirement of reliable
internal controls and records,22 and compliance with the
independence requirements of auditors and audit committee
members23 are examples of such provisions. The absence of a private
18. Even before securities class action pleading requirements were tightened significantly
by the PSLRA, pleading scienter on the part of the defendant was still a challenge for the
plaintiff under the particularity requirement of FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). See, e.g., Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissing action for failure of plaintiff to allege
facts that defendant was aware of serious health risks posed by the company’s major product
when touting to investors the product’s effectiveness).
19. Thus, after recognizing in Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (en
banc), that brokers breach their disclosure obligations to their customers when executing trades
at the national best bid and offer price with knowledge that reasonable efforts would likely
achieve an even better price for the customer, id. at 274–75, the suit was ultimately dismissed
because individual issues of causation were believed to overwhelm the common questions of law
and fact across the class’ members, Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 193 (3d Cir. 2001).
20. The SEC faces no limitations period, SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491–93 (9th Cir.
1993), except to the extent any part of the relief sought constitutes a fine, penalty or forfeiture.
Id. at 1492–93; see also Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing a five-
year limitation period for penalties imposed as punishment by the government “which go[]
beyond remedying the damage caused to the harmed parties by the defendant’s action”).
21. The net capital rule, Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1
(2003), is designed to reduce the likelihood that brokers will fail due to their own trading
behavior. Through a complicated set of requirements, the rule sets minimum levels of capital a
broker must maintain. See generally Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital Rule, 47 BUS. LAW. 863
(1992) (examining the “basic structure of the Rule, describing its fundamental sections and
underlying policy considerations”).
22. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000)
(mandating that registered companies maintain adequate books and records and internal
control procedures).
23. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 206, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(l) (West Supp. 2003)
(mandating that auditor may not provide audit services to a registrant if one of its senior
financial officers within one year was employed by the auditor and participated in the audit of
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action may well be because the nature of the regulation is one that
focuses not on investor protection as such, but rather on achieving
desired efficiency or general confidence in the market. Violation of
such a broadly based social objective is a poor candidate to isolate
particular investor harm and, therefore, to equip the investor with a
private enforcement remedy, let alone to exclude the SEC from
enforcement. If the SEC then is to have an enforcement mission, why
not allow its actions to cover those violations where there may also be
private harms that arise from the violation. A related factor is the a
priori concern that private actions may well be fortuitous, but that
SEC actions may be more deliberate in their focus. As we will see in
the data assembled in this Article, there is little overlap between
private and SEC suits. This finding documents the a priori assumption
that reliance solely on private enforcement will in turn depend on
serious imperfections in the market for private suits, discussed next.
Having access to the federal fisc to fund its activities, as well as
being the entity with whom many regulatory filings are made, are
each equally compelling in placing the agency at the vortex of
detecting and then prosecuting violations of the SEC’s rules. These
considerations need to be coupled with the weak incentives that
accompany class actions generally, and securities actions in particular,
that are well understood.24 Although experience with the modern
class action did not inform Congress’ actions in the New Deal era of
the securities laws, it certainly has been an important consideration
for later Congresses. By amending the securities laws in 1984,25 1990,26
and 2002,27 Congress expanded significantly the SEC’s enforcement
arsenal, and in 1995 Congress undertook sweeping changes to address
abuses of private securities class actions. Each initiative can be seen
the registrant and mandating complete independence of audit committee members of listed
companies).
24. See supra note 12.
25. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 amended the Exchange Act to authorize the
SEC to impose a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of profits made or losses avoided
by any person who violated the antifraud rules by inside trading or tipping. In 1988, Congress
returned to this subject, among other steps, to impose control person responsibility for insider
trading and tipping. See Securities Exchange Act § 21A(a)(1)−(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1)−(2)
(originally enacted as Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 3, 102
Stat. 4677, 4677−80) (authorizing judicial action by the SEC in response to insider trading and
setting the maximum allowable penalty).
26. Securities Enforcement and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104
Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
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as reflecting the national mood and the overall importance of strong
resolute enforcement of the securities laws by the SEC.
For all the reasons identified above, it is important that the SEC
discharge its enforcement responsibilities efficiently. Part I, examines
the mechanisms the SEC has at hand to carryout its enforcement
mission.
I.  MECHANISMS TO FULFILL THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT MANDATE
The SEC has broad authority to initiate enforcement actions
when a violation of the securities laws has occurred, is occurring, or is
about to occur.28 With the enactment of the Securities Enforcement
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,29 the SEC now enjoys a
panoply of enforcement options for fraudulent reporting practices.
Before the 1990 legislation, the SEC’s options for prosecuting such
violations were extremely limited: the SEC could initiate an
injunctive action in federal court,30 or, if the misleading item appeared
in a report required to be filed with the SEC, the SEC could bring an
administrative action under section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act.31
However, the 15(c)(4) administrative remedy arguably was limited to
requiring the registrant to correct its filing.32 A somewhat more
sweeping administrative sanction existed under the Securities Act in
the form of a stop order or refusal order when a registration
statement filed with the SEC was believed to be materially
misleading.33 More frequently, the SEC resorted to negotiations with
28. See Exchange Act § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (authorizing SEC enforcement
actions in the federal district court).
29. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
30. See 104 Stat. at 931 (enacted “[t]o amend the Federal securities laws in order to provide
additional enforcement remedies for violations of those laws”).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (authorizing administrative action when reporting company
“has failed to comply” with disclosure requirements to compel the issuer to bring itself into
compliance).
32. On the operation of section 15(c)(4) actions, see generally William R. McLucas &
Laurie Romanowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings Under Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 BUS. LAW. 145 (1985). Section 15(c)(4) is virtually moribund as a
result of the SEC receiving in 1990 authority for cease-and-desist enforcement actions.
33. See Securities Act of 1933 § 8(b), (d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b), (d) (2000) (allowing,
respectively, the SEC to stop the registration of a security when the filed matter “on its face” is
materially inaccurate or to issue an order stopping the effectiveness of a registration statement
that the SEC deems materially misleading). See generally William R. McLucas, Stop Order
Proceedings Under the Securities Act of 1933: A Current Assessment, 40 BUS. LAW. 515, 515
(1985) (examining “the Commission’s stop order authority and the issues that arise in
connection with stop order proceedings”).
COX.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
2003] SEC ENFORCEMENT HEURISTICS 747
the offending parties that culminated in a settlement embodied in a
report of the results of its investigation as authorized by section 21(a)
of the Exchange Act.34
The principal purpose of the 1990 legislation was to introduce
greater flexibility into the SEC’s enforcement program with the
objective of allowing the SEC “to achieve the appropriate level of
deterrence in each case and thereby maximize the remedial effects of
its enforcement actions.”35 While augmenting the SEC’s enforcement
arsenal in a variety of other contexts, such as administrative fines
against brokers, investment advisors, and clearing agents,36 after the
1990 legislation the SEC enjoyed a new array of enforcement
sanctions that it can invoke in the courts or in an administrative
proceeding for financial fraud violations. Foremost among these new
tools is the ability to proceed administratively to obtain a cease-and-
desist order against one who “is violating, has violated, or is about to
violate” the securities laws.37 This remedy is also available against
anyone who is the cause of such misconduct. In connection with any
cease-and-desist order, the SEC is expressly empowered to force the
respondent to disgorge any ill-gotten gains.38
One benefit of the cease-and-desist order is that if the SEC
sought the same relief via a judicially granted injunction, the
defendant could face significant collateral consequences that arise
automatically when certain regulated parties are subject to an
injunction. An example of such a consequence is that anyone who is
the subject of an SEC injunction cannot serve as an officer or director
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2000) (authorizing the SEC to make investigations into possible
violations and to publish its findings). Settlements arrived at pursuant to statutory authority to
issue reports are inherently problematic. See The Commission’s Practice Relating to Reports of
Investigations and Statements Submitted to the Commission Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 15,664, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,014, at 81,558–59 (Mar. 21, 1979) (containing comments of
Commissioner Roberta Karmel criticizing use of section 21(a) reports to reach settlements
sanctioning violations); ABA Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 BUS. LAW. 1083,
1140–49 (1992) (criticizing the use of settlements to establish legal principles as a substitute for
formal rulemaking).
35. H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 13 (1990).
36. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 21B, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (authorizing administrative
fines to be imposed for misconduct by brokers, including those that deal only in federal or
municipal securities, securities analysts, and clearing agents).
37. Securities Act § 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a); Securities Exchange Act § 21C(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78u-3(a).
38. Securities Act § 8A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(e); Securities Exchange Act § 21C(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78u-3(e).
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of an investment company.39 Such a serious collateral consequence
may cause the defendant in a SEC injunctive action to resist more
vigorously than if the SEC proceeded to obtain a cease-and-desist
order for the same misconduct.
The sanctions available in SEC judicial enforcement actions were
also addressed in the 1990 legislation. The Act expressly authorizes
the SEC to seek a judicial order that bars or suspends an individual
who has violated the antifraud provisions from serving as an officer or
director of a SEC reporting company.40 Although the SEC had
obtained such bars in appropriate cases before the 1990 legislation,41
the 1990 legislation removed any doubt about the SEC’s authority to
seek such relief. Congress also sought to strengthen the deterrence
effects of SEC enforcement actions by empowering the SEC to ask
the presiding court to impose civil monetary penalties upon
violators.42 Before the 1990 legislation, the SEC enjoyed this authority
only in the case of insider trading violations.43
To illustrate the SEC’s choice of enforcement fora, Table 1
presents data on the number of different types of enforcement
proceedings initiated by the SEC over the last six years.44
39. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(2) (2000); see also
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(4) (2000) (authorizing the
SEC to suspend an investment advisor who is subject to an order of court as a consequence of
violating the securities laws). Moreover, the “bad boy” disqualifiers that appear in certain SEC
regulations bar resort to regulatory exemptions and safe harbors when the issuer or certain of its
senior management are the subject of a court order arising from violation of the securities laws.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.262(a)(4), (b)(2) (2003) (conditioning Regulation A in such a manner); id. §
230.507(a) (recognizing that the safe harbors provided by Regulation D contain such a bad boy
disqualifier).
40. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2) (West Supp.
2003) (individuals can be barred from serving as an officer or director of a reporting company if
facts establish their “unfitness to serve as an officer or director” of reporting company).
41. See, e.g., Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973−74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
94,501, at 95,759 (D. Ariz. 1974) (prohibiting defendant from “assuming a position as or
continuing to act as either an officer or director of any public company except upon a showing
to the Court that measures have been taken to prevent repetition of the [prohibited] conduct”).
42. Congress sought to increase deterrence by adding fines in 1990.
43. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (providing that a civil
penalty for insider trading can be imposed that does not exceed three times the profit gained or
loss avoided; a culpable control person can be liable for not greater than a similar amount or $1
million).
44. This data is taken from SEC ANN. REP. 2 (2002); SEC ANN. REP. 1 (2001).
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TABLE 1
TYPES OF SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS: 1997–2002
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Civil
Injunctive
Actions
189 214 198 223 205 270
Administrative
Proceedings
285 248 298 244 248 280
Contempt
Proceedings
14 15 29 36 31 47
Report of
Investigations
1 0 0 0 0 1
Total 489 477 525 503 484 598
The data in Table 1 suggest a strong preference for
administrative enforcement actions. However, the wide range of
possible violations that can be the focus of an SEC enforcement
action prevents any reliable conclusions to be drawn by merely
comparing aggregate judicial actions with the total number of
administrative enforcement proceedings.
Table 2 presents a more complete picture of the division of
enforcement actions for 2001 and 2002 between civil injunctive
actions in the federal courts and internal administrative proceedings.45
Several interesting observations arise from the data in Table 2. At
least for the displayed years, there is surprising consistency in the
year-to-year composition of the types of suits that pique the SEC’s
enforcement actions. We also note a substantial overall increase in
the number of enforcement actions commenced in 2002 over 2001.
Because our focus in this Article is the interplay, if any, of SEC
and private suits, the data in Table 2 can assist us in isolating the
types of enforcement actions in which there most likely could be
private suits. The most common types of violations that give rise to
securities class actions are those involving misrepresentations
committed in the public offering of securities, misleading financial
reports of issuers, and insider trading cases. In contrast, market
manipulation rarely gives rise to class action claims, and actions for
45. SEC ANN. REP. 144 (2002); SEC ANN. REP. 134 (2001).
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TABLE 2
SEC CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS: 2001–2002
2001 2002
Civil Admin. Total Civil Admin. Total
Securities
Offerings
56 39
95
(20%)
79 40
119
(20%)
Broker-
Dealer
13 52
65
(13%)
17 65
82
(14%)
Issuer
Financial
Statements
and Reporting
41 71
112
(23%)
69 94
163
(27%)
Other
Regulated
Entities46
13 33
46
(9%)
15 39
54
(9%)
Insider
Trading
47 10
57
(12%)
53 6
59
(10%)
Market
Manipulation
17 23
40
(8%)
27 15
42
(7%)
Delinquent
Filings
5 9
14
(3%)
0 10
10
(2%)
Contempt
Proceedings
31 0
31
(6%)
47 0
47
(8%)
Other 13 12
25
(5%)
10 12
22
(3%)
Total 236 249
48547
(100%)
317 281
598
(100%)
broker-dealer, investment company, and investment company advisor
misconduct are customarily not prosecuted as class actions. From this
recent data, we can conclude that about one-half of SEC enforcement
actions could have a parallel securities class action claim.48 Also of
46. This category refers to actions against investment companies, investment advisers, and
transfer agents.
47. This source reports one more case in the aggregate total than appears in Table 1, and
we suspect it is an administrative proceeding labeled as “miscellaneous” in the SEC’s report.
48. This is derived by totaling the percentages for “securities offerings” (20%/95), “issuer
financial statement and reporting (23%/112), and insider trading (12%/57) proceedings.
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note is that even though securities offering and issuer reporting frauds
are prosecuted with about equal frequency in judicial (245 instances
in 2001 and 2002) and administrative proceedings (244 instances in
2001 and 2002), the SEC consistently prosecutes securities offering
violations more frequently in court while showing a strong preference
for administrative proceedings to prosecute issuer reporting
violations.
In several respects, we might conclude that the total volume of
SEC enforcement proceedings is quite modest compared to those
possible. First, the volume of complaints the SEC received from
investors the last few years exceeded 20,000 per year.49 Second, unless
there is an amazingly high level of compliance with the securities
laws, it would appear that an enterprise where 17,000 reporting
companies file at least four different reports each year could well be
expected to produce more than the current 112 enforcement actions a
year (an amount that equals slightly more than 0.6 percent of the total
number of reporting companies). On the other hand, because about
half of the investor complaints the SEC receives involve broker-
dealers, many may involve both misunderstandings by the
complaining party as well as misconduct too isolated to merit
deployment of an SEC investigator. And, it may well be that
compliance with the U.S. securities laws is quite high, so that the
small percentage of SEC enforcement proceedings is as expected.
The actual distribution of judicial and administrative
enforcement cases among types of violations reflects the overriding
priorities the SEC must maintain in light of its limited resources. As
recently reported:
[The] SEC generally prioritizes the cases in terms of (1) the message
delivered to the industry and public about the reach of SEC’s
enforcement efforts, (2) the amount of investor harm done, (3) the
deterrent value of the action, and (4) SEC’s visibility in certain areas
such as insider trading and financial fraud.50
49. The number of investor complaints to the SEC in 2000 was 20,431, with nearly one-half
being focused on broker-dealers. SEC ANN. REP. 28 (2001).
50. Major Human Capital Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies: Hearing Before the
S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring & the Dist. of Columbia, Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter Human Capital Hearings] (statement of
Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community Investments, & Loren
Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade).
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The fact that resources are limited so that priorities must be set places
the above data in context. Enforcement actions serve as a bright
beacon regarding what the SEC believes is important and it gauges
importance by several metrics. Foremost among those is the message
that an enforcement action communicates to the market and its
participants. This dimension of the heuristic used to consider whether
to commence a formal SEC enforcement action is beyond reproach
for anyone who witnessed the immediate impact of the SEC’s
successful prosecution of insider trading cases, beginning with the
landmark enforcement action in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.51 The
SEC, through its path-breaking prosecutions on insider trading, not
only established the boundaries of insider trading regulation, but also
legitimized regulation of this phenomenon in the first place. Similarly
the SEC’s aggressive pursuit of corporate bribery and off-books slush
funds in the aftermath of the Watergate investigations riveted the
public’s attention52 and ultimately led to legislation53 on the reporting
abuses that can flow from a corporation’s acquiescence in systematic
bribery.54 More recently, the SEC concluded a series of enforcement
actions surrounding its Regulation FD,55 which have made issuers and
their advisors even more aware of the SEC’s commitment to equal
access to confidential information by all market participants.
51. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
52. See U.S. SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS
AND PRACTICES (1976) (detailing the seemingly widespread practice of bribery as a means of
securing business).
53. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
54. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is the source of the books and records requirements
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which require registrants to maintain accounting records
in sufficient detail and accuracy as to fairly reflect transactions and dispositions of company
assets as well as to devise and maintain a system of internal control sufficient to assure that
transactions are carried out according to management’s authorization and that financial
statements can be prepared in accordance with governing accounting principles. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(A)−(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)−(B) (2000).
55. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100−.103 (2003), in broad overview, prohibits
domestic registrants from disclosing material, nonpublic information to a broker, dealer,
investment adviser, investment company, and to holders of its securities in certain
circumstances, unless such information is simultaneously made available to the public. See, e.g.,
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Motorola, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,898, 2002 SEC LEXIS 3008, at *3−*8 (Nov. 25,
2002) (detailing violation of Regulation FD). For samples of the press reports of this
development, see Kathleen Day, SEC Enforces Disclosure Rule for First Time, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 2002, at E1; Floyd Norris, SEC Puts Data Disclosure in the Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2002, at C1; and Randall Smith & Jesse Drucker, Unfair Disclosure: SEC Brings Series of
Cases, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2002, at C-1.
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Equally important is the need to protect investors from the
ongoing harm of a violation. Thus, even though the deterrence value
of an SEC action may in the particular case be slight, the threat of
ongoing injury to investors can sway a regulator to commit its
resources to a substantive violation that otherwise may have been
crowded off the SEC’s agenda if the violation was not ongoing.
However, any priority setting inherently means that not all cases for
which the SEC has a potential substantive dog in the fight will be
engaged. It is here that the private attorney general thesis has its
greatest traction.
II.  SEC RECOVERIES ON BEHALF OF INJURED INVESTORS
When seeking civil injunctive relief, the SEC has long invoked
the authority of the presiding court to concurrently seek ancillary
relief.56 Among the ancillary remedies so requested is a court order
requiring the defendant to disgorge any ill-gotten gains garnered
through the violation.57 It was only a short step from this remedy to
allowing the disgorged sums to be placed in a fund that would be
available for those harmed as a consequence of the violation.58 In
conjunction with a court order, the SEC can ask the court to appoint
a receiver for the defendant’s affairs who would, among other things,
pursue or even manage the assets of the defendant with the objective
of providing funds to investors harmed by the defendant’s violation.
Furthermore, as noted above, the 1990 legislation expands the SEC’s
authority to obtain disgorgement in administrative cease-and-desist
56. Forms of ancillary relief include not simply disgorgement, but also the appointment of
receivers, see, e.g., SEC v. Wencke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging the
“inherent” authority of the court to impose a receivership in appropriate circumstances), the
appointment of special counsel to carry out an internal investigation of the registrant’s affairs,
see, e.g., Data Access Sys., Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,779, at
94,005 (D.N.J. 1982) (examining recommendations made by the court-appointed “Special
Agent”), and the creation of an audit committee, see, e.g., SEC v. Oak Indus., SEC Litigation
Release No. 10801, 1985 SEC LEXIS 1238, at *6−*7 (June 25, 1985) (requiring the company to
maintain an audit committee of its board of directors for five years).
57. The SEC took a major step forward in increasing the deterrence effect of disgorgement
remedies by seeking interest on the sums to be disgorged from the date of the violation. See,
e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (recovering profits the
defendant garnered on shares acquired outside the statutory grace period for an early warning
filing under the Williams Act, plus interest thereon).
58. On the general subject of disbursements of sums recovered via SEC disgorgement
orders, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 pt. IV.B (2003) [hereinafter SEC DISGORGEMENT STUDY].
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proceedings.59 Pursuant to this expanded authority, the SEC, in
appropriate and what have now become numerous cases, continues its
prior practice of calling for the disgorged sums to be available for
restitution and other relief for those harmed by the defendant’s
misconduct.60
A further development linking SEC enforcement activities to
recoveries by private investors occurred in July 2002, when Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.61 Section 308(a) of the Act
authorizes the SEC, in its discretion, to apply for the benefit of
victims of a securities law violation the civil penalties (i.e., fines)
collected in enforcement cases toward any disgorgement funds
obtained from the respondent.62 This so-called “Fair Fund” provision
thus expands the sum of money that can become available to victims
of a securities law violation. Indirectly, it provides additional
incentive for the SEC to impose civil penalties in its administrative
proceedings against certain market professionals, and to seek civil
penalties in its court enforcement actions.
The Fair Fund provision does have important limitations though.
For example, it applies only in proceedings where the fined defendant
is also required to disgorge funds to the SEC. Thus, if the particular
defendant has not garnered any ill-gotten gain for which
disgorgement would otherwise be appropriate, no part of the fine
imposed upon that defendant can be made available to the victims of
that violation. An even more limiting effect of the Fair Fund
provision is that even though some of the violators in a fraudulent
activity are required to disgorge sums they gained as a consequence
of their violation, no part of the civil fine imposed upon co-violators,
who avoided disgorgement because they did not benefit from their
misconduct, would be made available to their victims.
59. See, e.g., Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(e) (2000)) (granting the
SEC the authority to enter an order requiring accounting and disgorgement, “including
reasonable interest”).
60. See SEC DISGORGEMENT STUDY, supra note 58, pt. IV.B (“[A]nalyz[ing] what aspects
of cases make it more likely there will be a distribution to injured investors.”).
61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
62. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7246(a) (West Supp. 2003).
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Disgorgements the SEC obtains for the benefit of victims of
securities fraud can be quite sizeable.63 For example, in a pre-
Sarbanes-Oxley enforcement action, Michael Saylor, the CEO of
MicroStrategy, Inc., was required to disgorge over $8 million into a
class action fund in connection with his insider trading.64 Furthermore,
a recent SEC study of disgorgement and penalty cases arising from
fraudulent offerings of securities over the past five years found that
“on a per defendant basis, the largest amounts of disgorgement paid
ranged from $1.7 million to $6.5 million, for a total of approximately
$33 million paid by eight defendants.”65
By far, the bulk of the funds the SEC has recovered through
disgorgement for the benefit of investors has come from successful
prosecutions of enforcement actions in the federal courts. The SEC’s
study reports that in thirty-four of the eighty-seven studied district
court actions, a total of over one billion dollars was recovered and
paid directly to approximately 125,000 investors.66 However, the
SEC’s study reflects that sizable disgorgements occur in only a
distinct minority of disgorgement cases.67 Specifically, of the 35
financial fraud actions in the SEC study, two separate actions account
for over 70 percent of the disgorgement funds ordered.68
It is unlikely that profit disgorgements generated by the Fair
Fund provision can be expected to displace private recoveries in
many situations. As the SEC found in its own study, “financial fraud
63. For a study of SEC disgorgement and penalty cases with an emphasis, but by no means
exclusive focus on funds being made available to the victims, of securities frauds, see SEC
DISGORGEMENT STUDY, supra note 58, at 5. The study by the SEC’s Office of Economic
Analysis examined eight types of cases, including the six most important enforcement program
areas: offering fraud, issuer financial fraud and reporting, broker-dealer, insider trading, non-
broker-dealer regulated entities, and market manipulation, involving 513 defendants covering
the five years ending July 31, 2002. Id.
64. Michael Jerry Saylor, et. al., SEC Litigation Release No. 16,829, 2000 SEC LEXIS
2743, *2 (Dec. 14, 2000). It should be noted, however, that in the subsequent settlements of the
MicroStrategy class action suit, the company contributed $98.5 million, In re MicroStrategy, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 172 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2001), and its auditors $55 million to the
settlement, id. at 781 n.3.
65. SEC DISGORGEMENT STUDY, supra note 58, at 9. These eight defendants comprised
less than 4 percent of the total offering fraud defendants in the sample; however, their
disgorgements constituted 75 percent of the total disgorgement received from all defendants
related to offering fraud cases. Id.
66. Id. at 10. In four of the thirty-four cases, the funds were disgorged into an investor fund
established in private litigation or to the bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of creditors and
shareholders. Id.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
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violations . . . may cause huge investor losses that dwarf, by several
orders of magnitude, any profit that violators may have made.”69 As
seen above, this was the story in the MicroStrategy case.70 Indirectly
the SEC addresses this concern by its “real time” enforcement efforts,
whereby it swiftly seeks to obtain relief to prevent further harm from
a violation.71 Nevertheless, it is the nature of financial fraud violations
that the harm caused as a consequence of misrepresenting the firm’s
performance or financial position is often greater than any profit
violators take home. For example, the amount that a publicly traded
firm’s market value is inflated by a false announcement of earnings
exceeds any private benefit those responsible for the
misrepresentation may have gained through their misconduct. Thus,
when outside accountants turn a blind eye to an overstatement of
revenue so that annual reports inflate their client’s performance, the
resulting inflation in the firm’s market value and investor harm can be
expected to greatly exceed any direct or indirect rewards the
accountants derived from their complicity in the fraud. As seen
above, the Fair Fund provision now authorizes the SEC to augment
the funds available to harmed investors with the civil penalties
imposed upon the defendants. Even though these sums can be
considerable, with the largest penalty now authorized reaching $25
million in the case of willful violations by an entity,72 this amount can
pale when compared to the harm proximately caused by the
defendants’ violation.73 And, as seen in the next Part, by far the
greatest limiting factor on federal enforcement actions is the
resources the SEC can commit to these efforts.74
69. Id. at 1.
70. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
71. SEC DISGORGEMENT STUDY, supra note 58, at 22.
72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West. Supp. 2003).
73. See id. (indicating that the amount for a natural person who commits a violation
willfully is $5 million). Outside of this criminal sanction, the maximum fine per violation is
$500,000 for a non-natural person ($100,000 for a natural person). Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 21B(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b)(3) (2000).
74. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (observing
that even as securities markets have grown in recent years, SEC resources have declined).
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III.  THE SEC AS THE HEROIC “DAVID”
The resource limitations faced by the SEC are a much studied
and well understood problem.75 Pursuing a philosophy that an ounce
of protection is worth a pound of enforcement, the staff of the SEC
reviews the mandatory filings of its registrants. Such SEC staff
reviews can be seen as the first line of defense against ongoing
disclosure violations. Despite the obvious social welfare implications
of staff reviews, the SEC’s funding to carryout reviews has been
severely limited so that the percentage of filings examined by the
SEC has continued to decline because the number of registrants and
corporate filings simply increased at a far faster rate than has the
SEC’s budget. For example, from 1991 to 2000, the number of filings
with the SEC increased by 60 percent; however, during the same
period, the filings receiving some type of review declined from 21
percent to 8 percent.76 The SEC’s announced goal in 2001 was to
achieve a full review of each of its 17,000 issuer’s annual reports once
every three years—a review rate of 30 to 35 percent; however, in 2001
it completed a full review for only 16 percent of those issuers, thus
achieving only half of its earlier stated goal.77
Equally dramatic resource pressures exist for the SEC’s
enforcement staff. Over the past decade, the SEC’s enforcement staff
increased by 16 percent, while the number of cases commenced in
that same time period increased by 65 percent and the number of
75. See, e.g., Critical Resource and Staffing Issues Facing the SEC: Testimony Before the S.
Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring & the Dist. of Columbia, Comm. on
Gov’t Affairs, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) (testimony of James M. McConnell, Executive Director,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) (“[A]s the complexity and utilization of our
financial markets continues to grow unabated, the Commission must have the resources it needs
to fulfill its multiple missions and to maintain the public’s full confidence in our capital
markets.”); Human Capital Hearings, supra note 50, at 5–6 (statement of Richard J. Hillman,
Director of Financial Markets and Community Investments, & Loren Yager, Director of
International Affairs and Trade) (“[L]imited resources have forced SEC to be selective in its
enforcement activities and have lengthened the time required to complete certain enforcement
investigations.”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS INCREASED WORKLOAD
CREATES CHALLENGES (2002) [hereinafter GAO SEC OPERATIONS REPORT] (same); SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N., REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCES ON THE SECURITIES MARKETS 70–80 (1997) (indicating that as technology
develops, monitoring for fraud presents “a substantial challenge”).
76. Human Capital Hearings, supra note 50, at 5 (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director
of Financial Markets and Community Investments, & Loren Yager, Director of International
Affairs and Trade).
77. Id.
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cases pending at the close of this period grew by 77 percent.78 Some of
the SEC’s staffing problems were exacerbated by the riches that lured
talented enforcement staff to the private sector during a period of
strong economic growth; one-third of the enforcement staff left the
SEC between 1998 and 2000.79 Overall, the General Accounting
Office Report data reflect that in 1996, the SEC’s workload started to
increase at a much higher rate than the SEC staff years the agency
could commit to meeting its growing workload.80
Gross staffing numbers are only part of the sad funding story of
the SEC. The detection and enforcement problems that arise from
the decline in staffing relative to the far faster rate of filings, and
more generally the significant growth in the U.S. capital markets,
were compounded by a high turnover of the SEC’s most experienced
staff. Between 1992 and 1999, due to departures the average tenure of
an examiner decreased from 3.4 to 2.5 years so that the agency
suffered a serious erosion of the most experienced staff for all areas
of the SEC’s operations.81 The obvious point is that a more
experienced staff can handle a much higher workload than a less
experienced staff. Not surprisingly, compensation is the overriding
consideration for those leaving the SEC.82
Two recent developments have retarded the pace of staff
departures. First, the prolonged recession that began in 2001 has
provided fewer opportunities for non-SEC employment than existed
with the steadily expanding economy of the 1990s. Staff defections
have declined because there was no place for talented attorneys to
migrate. Second, Congress enacted legislation in January 2002
exempting the SEC from federal pay restrictions and giving it
authority to bring a large number of positions in line with the higher
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id. at 6–7. As a result, 250 positions remained unfilled at the close the SEC’s fiscal year,
September 2001—8.5 percent of its authorized positions—and overall, the average tenure of an
SEC attorney declined from 3.4 to 2.5 years between 1992 and 1999. Id. at 7.
80. GAO SEC OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 75, at 12.
81. Human Capital Hearings, supra note 50, at 7 (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director
of Financial Markets and Community Investments, & Loren Yager, Director of International
Affairs and Trade).
82. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REPORT TO THE RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, SUBCOMM.
ON FIN. INSTITUTIONS, COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE:
SEC: HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES REQUIRE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION 2, 26 fig. 8 (2001).
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federal pay of other federal regulators.83 The combination of these
two factors has meant that staff departures have declined. And a third
positive development for confronting its growing workload is that in
response to the recent financial and accounting scandals, the SEC has
obtained its largest funding increase in its history.84 Its budget has
been increased for the express purposes of enhancing its capacity to
review more frequently the filings of its registrants and to increase its
enforcement capabilities.
Our intuition is that funding for the SEC will, as it has in the
past, increase over time in response to political forces stimulated by
public revelation and reaction to dramatic scandals such as those that
preceded the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. One can certainly expect
the SEC’s staff to grow more rapidly during times of abundance when
the federal fisc is bountiful than during an era of budgetary austerity.
Because the number, breadth, and scope of the recent scandals are
unparalleled in recent history, we believe that future funding
increases will be more along the lines of the first sixty years of the
SEC’s history, namely episodic, large augmentations in its staffing,
sprinkled among more modest budget increases. At the same time,
there is every reason to believe its workload will expand with the
steadily growing, and increasingly more complex, capital markets.
We add to this uncertainty, whether the current level of SEC
funding is sufficient for it to achieve the optimal amount of detection,
enforcement, and deterrence of financial frauds. Just what is the right
level of funding is problematic and beyond even conjecture in this
Article. However, we are interested in exploring an important
correlative point: assuming that the SEC lacks the resources to
achieve the utopian level of detection, enforcement, and deterrence,
what evidence is there, first, that its efforts are supplemented in
important ways by private litigants, and second, that the SEC selects
optimal enforcement targets.
As seen earlier, the SEC gauges its enforcement priorities by the
message the action sends to the industry and public, the relative harm
to investors, the deterrent effects of the action, and the visibility the
SEC enjoys in combating such abuses. These appear to be excellent
heuristics for identifying from a large set of possible enforcement
83. The Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief Act, Pub. L. 107-123, 115 Stat. 2390
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d (2003)). However, currently, only about 10
percent of the SEC’s total personnel are covered by the pay parity provision.
84. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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actions where to allocate the agency’s scarce enforcement resources.
The social welfare benefits of applying these criteria wisely and
consistently appear obvious. To see if this is the case, the balance of
this Article focuses heavily on evaluating whether the targets of SEC
enforcement actions for financial reporting violations are consistent
with two of these criterianamely, whether the SEC appears to
target for its enforcement actions matters that involve greater harm to
investors and, to a lesser extent, whether the target actions are likely
to result in a deterrent message that is broadly understood as such by
the industry and public. Our data also examine the major supposition
of the private attorney general thesis, namely that private suits are
indeed a necessary component in the enforcement of the securities
laws.
IV.  TESTING SUPPOSITIONS AND SUSPICIONS REGARDING
PRIVATE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SUITS
The central question about private securities class action suits is
whether they contribute to social welfare. Concerns that too many
suits were “strike suits” led to the enactment of the PSLRA. Among
its features, the PSLRA introduced a mechanism for appointing as
the lead plaintiff an investor or investors with a sufficiently large loss
as a result of the alleged disclosure violation to serve as a monitor of
the suit’s attorney,85 more demanding pleading requirements that,
prior to class certification, invite close scrutiny of the factual bases for
believing that the defendants had committed a disclosure violation,86
discovery bars that prevent the filing of a complaint from serving as a
fishing expedition through the defendants’ records to determine
whether there is a claim,87 and steps to prevent individuals from
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) (noting that the “most adequate” lead
plaintiff would have the “largest financial interest” in the sought relief). For the view that it is
the relative size of the investor’s loss rather than the investor’s skill in negotiating a lower fee
with the class’s counsel that guides the selection of the lead plaintiff, see In re Cavanaugh, 306
F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2002). See also In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 268 (3d Cir.
2001) (observing that to choose a lead plaintiff turns not on whether another petitioner would
do a better job but whether the petitioner with the largest loss fails to be a “fair and adequate”
representative of the class).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring that scienter must be pled with particularity so as
to raise a “strong inference” that the defendant acted with the proscribed state of mind).
87. See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (providing a stay of discovery during the pendency of any
motion to dismiss, unless the discovery is necessary to “preserve evidence” or “prevent undue
prejudice”).
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serving as professional plaintiffs.88 Among the possible effects of these
reforms is that meritorious suits may not survive the new pleading
requirement and may therefore fall on the altar of pretrial dismissal
motions.89 At the same time, suits that survive are more likely to be
meritorious than was the case prior to the PSLRA.
From their fear that the PSLRA will prematurely extinguish
meritorious suits, it is a short step to surmise that the plaintiffs’ bar
will now have an even keener interest in SEC enforcement actions
because an enforcement action’s fruits include facts that can support a
class action’s complaint, thereby filling the current discovery void
faced by the plaintiffs’ bar after the enactment of the PSLRA.90
However, free-rider concerns regarding the initiation of private
securities class action suits that predate the PSLRA arguably are even
greater in the post-PSLRA era.91 Equally important is whether the
relief obtained in the private action is materially greater than what
the SEC may have recovered pursuant to its enforcement action. That
is, one important inquiry here is whether a SEC enforcement action
88. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (declaring that except as the court may permit, a person is
barred from being a lead plaintiff if that person has participated in more than five securities
class actions in a three-year period).
89. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 712–15 (1996) (emphasizing that there are better
ways to distinguish meritorious from nonmeritorious suits than to raise the pleading
requirements).
90. See, e.g., S.E. Bonner et al., Fraud Type and Auditor Litigation: An Analysis of SEC
and Accounting Enforcement Releases, 73 ACCT. REV. 503, 513 (1998) (observing that in the
study’s sample, the SEC enforcement action for certain types of financial statement
misrepresentations gave rise to private suits in 58 percent of the cases); Zoe-Vonna Palmrose &
Susan Scholz, The Circumstances and Legal Consequences of Non-GAAP Reporting: Evidence
from Restatements 23 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (finding private suits result in 86 percent of the instances when a company’s revenue
restatement is accompanied by SEC enforcement actions).
91. One dimension of the free-rider concern is that private litigation will follow public
announcement of a government prosecution and thus “pile on” to the good investigative efforts
of the government. See, e.g., In re PaineWebber Ltd. P’ships Litig., 999 F. Supp. 719, 725
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that fees awarded to class counsel were reduced below the amount
requested because earlier government investigation had produced voluminous evidence of
violation and thereby removed risk of private action). One possible way to examine this is to
compare the date when private suits are initiated and when the government enforcement action
is formally begun. Such a comparison was not pursued here because government enforcement
actions generally commence well in advance of their formal announcement by action of the
SEC. Therefore, a complaint that appears to be filed before the SEC has approved a formal
investigation of a matter may nevertheless be commenced after the SEC has begun its
investigation and there has been some public disclosure of its informal investigation.
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can be seen as the litmus test for a more meritorious suit than a
private suit commenced sans SEC enforcement action.
Skeptics of the securities class action bar may also reason that
there is a qualitative difference between class action suits where there
is a collateral SEC enforcement action and those where there is no
SEC enforcement action. As seen earlier, the SEC’s limited resources
force it to allocate its enforcement efforts to achieve the greatest
impact. Among the guiding heuristics the SEC claims to use is the
gravity of the harm caused by the violation. We may therefore
suppose that private recoveries for misconduct that has been the
subject of a SEC enforcement action will on average be statistically
larger both in absolute size and relative to the actual damages
suffered than when the private action concerns a matter that has not
been the subject of an SEC enforcement action.92
A more sympathetic view of the world, however, suggests that
the SEC’s limited resources and admitted lack of clairvoyance will
lead to no such relationship between the size (absolute or relative) of
private recoveries and the presence of an SEC enforcement action.
That is, the volume of violations is too great for the SEC to detect
and investigate all possible wrongdoing. When it makes its
assessments of the gravity of harm suffered, it does so with an eye on
a limited set of enforcement matters before the staff, and not the
wider universe of all possible securities violations. Moreover, the SEC
also weighs whether the violation is ongoing.93 With the SEC staff’s
awareness that a disclosure violation has ceased and that private suits
are moving forward to recover for those harmed by the violation, the
SEC may well decide to focus its efforts in other areas, such as
detecting and investigating possible ongoing violations. Under these
more sobering assumptions about the SEC’s focus, we can expect that
private litigation will frequently focus on suits that are not within the
SEC’s field of vision. We therefore need to examine the size of
recoveries in private suits when there is no parallel SEC prosecution.
92. A recent study by Cornerstone Research finds that private settlements are larger and
constitute a higher percentage of estimated damages when accompanied by a SEC enforcement
action. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES CASE SETTLEMENTS:
CASE REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2002, at 6 (2003).
93. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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V.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
To test the role private litigation plays in the overall enforcement
of the securities lawsespecially compensating those harmed as a
result of a disclosure violationwe use data that we compiled as part
of a separate study of securities class action settlements. In that study,
we gathered data on 265 securities fraud class actions that were
settled between 1990 and 2001 and that covered violations between
1986 and 2000. We reduced this sample by eliminating cases where
the only defendant party was an auditing firm. We also put aside
cases where financial data was not available from the Compustat
database. This left us with a sample of 248 class actions. For this set of
cases, we searched the SEC’s Enforcement Releases and also carried
out a Nexis search to identify settlements for which there was also a
collateral SEC enforcement action. We found that 37 out of our 248
cases were prosecuted by the SEC, and the remaining 211 cases were
only subject to private litigation.
The final sample helps examine the determinants of SEC
enforcement actions. As stated above, the SEC’s announced policy is
that it primarily targets violations for enforcement action based on
the message that will be sent to the public and to the industry about
the reach of its enforcement actions and the amount of investor harm.
We therefore examine in the context of our settled cases data set (1)
whether the cases brought by the SEC are the largest settlements in
terms of their absolute size and (2) whether the cases brought are
more likely to involve instances of the largest provable losses suffered
by the class of investors.
We begin with some bivariate comparisons between those
private cases in which there is a parallel SEC action and those private
actions filed alone. First, Table 3 compares the size of settlements in
private actions without a parallel SEC case with private actions with
an SEC proceeding.
The data show that private settlements are larger in cases where
there is a parallel SEC action.94 This difference supports the
hypothesis that the SEC tends to file enforcement actions in cases
with greater harm to investors. It may also reflect that the SEC
prosecutions occur when there is a stronger basis to conclude that a
94. This is consistent with the results in the Cornerstone Research study. See
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 92, at 6.
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violation has occurred. The difference in the medians between these
two subsets is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.95
TABLE 3
SETTLEMENT AMOUNT OF PRIVATE ACTIONS
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Mean Median Number ofObservations
Without a Parallel
SEC Action 9.5 4.8 211
With a Parallel
SEC Action
11.2 7.2 37
Total Sample 9.8 5.0 248
However, these differences may just reflect differences in the
market capitalization of the companies that are sued by the SEC and
those that are targeted solely by the private plaintiffs’ bar. Thus, if the
SEC tends to sue larger companies than those selected by the private
bar, we might anticipate that the size of settlement data shown above
could reflect the greater potential damages that are available when
larger capitalization companies are subject to securities fraud suits.
To test this supposition, we examined the difference between the
market capitalization of companies subject only to a private action
and those sued by both the SEC and the private bar. Table 4A
illustrates this comparison.
The market capitalization data clearly shows that the supposition
is not correct. In our sample, the SEC targeted companies with an
average market capitalization $735 million less than those sued by the
private plaintiffs’ bar alone.96 An earlier study reached a similar
95. The difference in the means is not statistically significant at the conventional levels of
significance. However, due to the presence of large outliers, we believe that the comparison of
the medians is more meaningful.
96. The data presented in Table 4A for our study’s sample is consistent with a separate
data set we compiled based on a recent SEC study in response to section 704 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Congress called upon the SEC to study enforcement actions for a five-year period preceding the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley to identify areas of issuer financial reporting that are most
susceptible to fraud. The resulting study collected information from 515 enforcement actions
involving 164 entities (and 705 individuals) between July 31, 1997 and July 30, 2002. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 704 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002, at 1–6 (2003). This represented approximately 20 percent of the total number of SEC
COX.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
2003] SEC ENFORCEMENT HEURISTICS 765
TABLE 4A
MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF DEFENDANT COMPANIES
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Mean Median Number ofObservations97
Without a Parallel
SEC Action 1206.8 128.4 186
With a Parallel
SEC Action 471.8 75.7 30
Total Sample 1104.7 114.5 216
enforcement actions during the five-year period. See id. at 1 n.4 (noting that the total number of
enforcement actions during the study period was 2,508). The bulk of the violations involved
improper revenue and/or expense recognition. Id. at 6. However, only 106 of the 227
investigations that spawned the 515 enforcement actions involved allegations of “fraud” as
proscribed by section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. The balance of the enforcement actions involved
violations of the Securities and Exchange Act’s “books and records” provisions for which there
is no private cause of action. Id. The books and records provisions appear in section 13(b)(2) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000), and Rules 13(b)(2)(A)–(B)
and 13(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(b)(2)(A)–(B), (b)(5) (2003).
From this fraud group, we used the Compustat data base to search for market
capitalization data for each company for the quarter before the SEC filed its enforcement
action. We were able to locate data for only 60 of the issuers involved in the 106 investigations
as many of the issuers were not within that database for any one of several possible reasons,
such as bankruptcy, acquisition or otherwise disappearing as separate entities. We then searched
the Securities Class Action Clearing House website maintained by the Stanford Law School and
Lexis-Nexis databases to discover instances in which a private action was commenced among
the 60 issuers.
Table 4B presents the results of our inquiry. Note that parallel private actions are filed
against issuers whose market capitalization is substantially greater than for issuers who are
subject to an SEC enforcement action for fraudulent reporting for which there is no private
action. The difference between the medians is statistically significant at the 5 percent level of
significance.
TABLE 4B
MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF FIRMS WITH SEC SECTION 704 STUDY
Mean Median
Number of
Observations
Without a Parallel
Private Action
263.82 29.68 27
With a Parallel Private
Action
1,872.07 82.19 33
Whole Sample 1,148.36 52.48 60
97. The total number of observations is reduced below 248 because some companies went
bankrupt and we cannot observe their market capitalization.
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conclusion, finding that the SEC almost always targets companies
with a market capitalization less than $200 million largely because
these smaller capitalized companies frequently lack audit committees,
or if they do have such committees, they do not appropriately staff
them.98 The differences in the medians are statistically significant at
the 5 percent level.
A second possible explanation of the larger settlements in
private cases in which there are SEC parallel proceedings could be
that the class period length is longer. A longer class period should
mean that more shares have been traded during the interval of
alleged fraud, and this will normally lead to a greater damage claim
for the plaintiffs. Table 5 below presents this data.
TABLE 5
CLASS PERIOD (MONTHS)
Mean Median Number ofObservations
Without a Parallel
SEC Action 11.0 9.0 211
With a Parallel
SEC Action 14.8 12.5 37
Whole Sample 11.6 9.4 248
Here we see that the class period in cases with parallel SEC
proceedings is longer than in instances where only a private action is
filed. For example, the median class period when the SEC has
prosecuted the same misconduct is more than one-third longer than
for class actions without a parallel SEC action. This supports the
SEC’s heuristics for initiating enforcement actions based on its belief
about which situations pose the greatest harm to investors. The data
in Table 5 also provide a possible alternative explanation for the
observed larger settlements in private actions filed in cases with
parallel SEC proceedings. The differences in medians are statistically
significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
Another characteristic by which the two groups may differ is the
time that it takes for the private action to reach settlement. This is
98. Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987–1997, An Analysis of U.S.
Companies (COSO 1999).
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measured by the number of months between the filing of the first
class action complaint and the date of the settlement of the
consolidated class action. Here we hypothesize that private
settlements will occur more quickly when there is a parallel SEC
investigation than when there is not. The causes for this perhaps
being the case are many. With the additional enforcement efforts of
the SEC, more information is likely to be available to the private class
action lawyers. More information improves their (as well as the
defense counsel’s) assessment of the suit’s likelihood of success with
the result that settlement will be seen as the most efficient result for
all parties. Also, a parallel SEC action creates a climate in which
defendants wish to put the “whole matter” behind them. Thus,
settlement in the SEC enforcement action is likely to stimulate
settlement of the private suit, and vice versa. Thus we would expect
that the length of time for settlements to be reached in private suits
will be shorter when there is an accompanying SEC enforcement
action. Table 6 provides some descriptive information about this
variable.
TABLE 6
TIME TO REACH SETTLEMENT (MONTHS)
Mean Median Number ofObservations99
Without a Parallel
SEC Action 26.8 23.8 152
With a Parallel
SEC Action 20.8 16.6 26
Whole Sample 25.9 22.3 178
As can be seen, cases with a parallel SEC proceeding do settle
more quickly—approximately two-thirds the median time—than
those without such an action, consistent with our expectations. The
differences of both the means and the medians are statistically
significantly different across the two sub-samples at the 10 percent
level of significance.
The more important question is whether the presence of an SEC
action is correlated with a higher recovery of potential damages in a
99. The total number of observations is reduced because we do not have complete
information on the timing of the filing of the complaint or the date of entry into the settlement.
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private suit. We therefore compare whether the sums recovered in
the settlement of private suits represent a higher fraction of provable
losses when there has been an SEC prosecution than when there has
been no SEC enforcement action. To determine whether a settlement
is better, we compare for each of our 248 settled class actions the
provable loss suffered by the class with the resulting settlement,
which we call the “provable loss ratio.” We then array the settlements
into ranges, running from settlements with the largest to the lowest
percentage recovered per provable loss. To calculate provable losses,
we use the damage estimation model described in the footnote
below.100 Tables 7 and 8 show our results.
100. The standard measure of damages for securities class actions is the price at which the
investors purchased or sold the security and what that price would have been but for the
misrepresentation. We refer to this as the provable loss for the class. Because the defendant is
responsible only for the harm it has caused by its misrepresentation, other events and forces that
affect the securities price must be removed from the calculus for measuring the provable loss.
To do this, we use the familiar market model to construct a “true-value line” for each of the 248
settlements in our data base. The market model holds:
Rit = αi +βi Rmt + εit
Where Rit is the return of a stock on day i for time period t, Rmt is the return of a market index
for time period t, αi is the asset specific intercept, βi is the observed correlation of the individual
return of security i, and εit is the so-called error term which is the return that cannot be
explained by market-wide events.
We have used the Equal-Weighted Market Index provided by the Center for Research
Securities Prices as our market index. To determine the individual security’s β, we commenced
our observation period for a two-year period ending six months before the commencement of
the class action period. We terminated our β calculations six months before the commencement
of the class action period because our data sample consistently reflected abnormal stock price
behavior in the three-month to six-month period before the commencement of the class period.
With the unexplained return, β, determined through the market model, we determined the true
value line by going backward in time; we apply the unexplained return to the security’s market
price in response to disclosure of truthful information (this was the market price the day after
the class action period closes). See generally Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using
Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 886–
89 (1990) (demonstrating the calculation of a value line); Harindra de Silva et al., Securities Act
Violations: Estimation of Damages, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE
ACCOUNTANT AS EXPERT WITNESS, 44-1 to -37 (Roman L. Weil et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995)
(describing the market model and how to estimate damages).
The next step toward measuring the provable losses for the class is to determine the
trading that occurred during the class action period. Here there are two, well-accepted,
approaches—the one-trader and the two-trader models. See generally Willard T. Carleton et al.,
Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (1996)
(distinguishing the “one-trader” model, where “all traders are identical,” from the “two-trader
model,” which assumes two types of investors, “traders” and “holders”). The one-trader model
assumes that each share within the class period has an equal probability of being traded at a
given time during the class period. Thus, on any day during the class period, the shares that are
sold are drawn randomly from all outstanding shares so that the resulting class action is made up
of shares that have not been traded since acquired in the class period and those that were
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TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF THE RATIO OF SETTLEMENT
AMOUNTS TO PROVABLE LOSSES
Without a Parallel SEC Action
Value101 Count Percent CumulativeCount
Cumulative
Percent
[0, 0.1) 135 64.0 135 64.0
[0.1, 0.2) 51 24.2 186 88.2
[0.2, 0.3) 8 3.8 194 91.9
[0.3, 0.4) 8 3.8 202 95.7
[0.4, 0.5) 4 1.9 206 97.6
[0.5, 0.6) 3 1.4 209 99.1
[0.7, 0.8) 1 0.5 210 99.5
[1.3, 1.4) 1 0.5 211 100.0
Total 211 100 211 100.0
With a Parallel SEC Action
Value Count Percent CumulativeCount
Cumulative
Percent
[0, 0.1) 17 46.0 17 46.0
[0.1, 0.2) 11 29.7 28 75.7
[0.2, 0.3) 6 16.2 34 91.9
[0.3, 0.4) 1 2.7 35 94.6
[0.7, 0.8) 1 2.7 36 97.3
[1.9, 2) 1 2.7 37 100.0
Total 37 100 37 100
acquired from others who purchased the securities within the class period. The two-trader
model divides investors into two sets according to their probable trading propensities. One set is
high-activity traders and the other are low-activity traders. Using data provided by Marcia
Kramer Mayer, we assume low-activity traders hold about 63 percent of the shares and account
for 17 percent of the trading, so that high-activity traders hold 37 percent of the shares and
account for 83 percent of the trading. See MARCIA KRAMER MAYER, BEST-FIT ESTIMATION OF
DAMAGE VOLUME IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS: THE MULTI-SECTOR, MULTI-TRADER
MODEL OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR 110 (Nat’l Econ. Research Ass’ns, Working Paper, 2000)
(demonstrating that high-activity traders were 8.6 times more likely to sell holdings on a given
day than low-activity traders). These models, because they make different assumptions
regarding the magnitude of in-and-out trading, yield quite different provable damage estimates.
A more extensive description of the methodology used to calculate provable damages is on file
with the Duke Law Journal.
101. Value is defined as the settlement amount divided by provable losses.
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Table 7 shows that the presence of a SEC enforcement action is
associated with a decrease in the number of cases that settle for less
than 10 percent of estimated damages. Correspondingly, the presence
of a SEC enforcement action is associated with more private
settlements that recover higher percentages of estimated damages for
the affected shareholders. However, this effect is only noticeable in
the range of 10–30 percent recoveries, and may even reverse itself for
recoveries above that level. Our sample size is too small to determine
whether these differences are statistically significant.
As Table 7 illustrates, the main difference observed between the
provable loss ratio in cases where the SEC files an action, and the
cases where it does not, arise in the very lowest portion of the
distribution. There is an eighteen-percentage-point difference in the
number of cases in the 0 to 0.1 interval of the distribution of cases
between private actions where there is no accompanying SEC action
and those in which there is a SEC action. To examine these
differences more closely, in Table 8 we breakdown the distribution
for the lowest range into one-percent categories.
When we look at Table 8, it becomes clear that the big difference
between these two sets of cases is in the very lowest part of the
distribution of settlement amounts to provable loss ratios. One-fourth
of all private settlements that occur for suits that yield less than 10
percent of provable losses are settled for less than 2 percent of
provable losses, and there are no parallel SEC actions for these small
settlements. Skeptics of the private bar can with some justification
reason that cases within these lowest ranges of the distribution most
likely represent strike suits filed by private lawyers, as they settle for
a tiny fraction of the provable losses. A possible explanation for this
difference is that the actions in which the SEC files a parallel action
are less likely to be frivolous.
To investigate this result further, we compared the market
capitalization and settlement amounts for the private actions not
involving parallel SEC enforcement actions that had a provable loss
ratio of less than 2 percent with those with a provable loss ratio of 2
percent or greater. There were 27 settlements recovering less than 2
percent of provable losses and 159 settlements (not involving a
parallel SEC action) recovering a greater percentage of provable
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TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF THE RATIO OF SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS TO
PROVABLE LOSSES IN [0, 0.1) INTERVAL
Without a Parallel SEC Action
Value Count Percent CumulativeCount
Cumulative
Percent
[0, 0.01) 11 8.15 11 8.15
[0.01, 0.02) 22 16.3 33 24.44
[0.02, 0.03) 15 11.11 48 35.56
[0.03, 0.04) 16 11.85 64 47.41
[0.04, 0.05) 24 17.78 88 65.19
[0.05, 0.06) 12 8.89 100 74.07
[0.06, 0.07) 7 5.19 107 79.26
[0.07, 0.08) 7 5.19 114 84.44
[0.08, 0.09) 9 6.67 123 91.11
[0.09, 0.1) 12 8.89 135 100
Total 135 100 135 100
With a Parallel SEC Action
Value Count Percent Cumulative
Count
Cumulative
Percent
[0,0.01) 0 0 0 0
[0.01,0.02) 0 0 0 0
[0.02, 0.03) 3 17.65 3 17.65
[0.03, 0.04) 3 17.65 6 35.29
[0.04, 0.05) 3 17.65 9 52.94
[0.06, 0.07) 1 5.88 10 58.82
[0.07, 0.08) 3 17.65 13 76.47
[0.08, 0.09) 3 17.65 16 94.12
[0.09, 0.1) 1 5.88 17 100
Total 17 100 17 100
losses.102 Our hypothesis was that private suits involving large
capitalization firms are settled for large amounts of money in terms of
102. Although Table 8 reflects 33 cases yielding a recovery of less than 0.02 (without there
being a parallel SEC action), we were able to obtain market capitalization data for only 27 of
these cases. The total number of cases without a parallel SEC enforcement action in our sample
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the absolute dollar amounts recovered in class actions generally;
however, because the issuers involved in these cases are significantly
larger in terms of their market capitalization, they also involve
significantly greater provable losses. If this claim is correct, it would
lead us to observe a higher market capitalization for companies with
less than 2 percent provable loss ratio.
In Table 9 we see that both the median and mean capitalization
of firms for which less than 2 percent of provable losses are
substantially greater than for firms for which a greater percentage of
provable losses was recovered through the settlement. Indeed, the
median market capitalization for the 27 firms involved in these
relatively smaller settlements was more than eight times the market
capitalization of firms for which greater than 2 percent of provable
losses was recovered. Our results are statistically significant at all
conventional levels of significance.
TABLE 9
MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF FIRMS WITH SETTLEMENTS WITHOUT
SEC ACTION
Market Capitalization Observations
Mean Median
Recovery Less than 0.02
Fraction of Provable Loss 4768.0 828.8 27
Recovery Greater than 0.02
Fraction of Provable Loss
602.0 101.5 159
Total 1206.8 128.4 186
These results make us hesitant to conclude that the low end of
the Ratio of Settlement to Provable Loss (PLR) distribution are
strike suitsthat suits yielding the lowest recovery are initiated
against the largest companies who will pay a relatively small amount
to rid itself of a nuisance suit. Rather, it seems likely that the
numerator (dollar value recovered in the settlement) of the provable
loss ratio is relatively constant while the denominator (provable
losses) is much bigger for these very large companies. This is
confirmed by the data: there are substantive provable losses in these
is 211 so that there are 178 such class actions yielding payments in excess of 0.02 for which there
is market capitalization data for 159 of the actions.
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cases and, in absolute dollar amounts, the median settlements
yielding only 2 percent of provable losses are not statistically different
from settlements that recover more than 2 percent of provable
losses.103 To explore these findings further, we also examined the
relationship between the size of the settlement and the size of the
defendant company. We found that the absolute amount of the
settlement displays almost no correlation with the market
capitalization of the firm being sued.104
If the dollar amount of the settlement is relatively invariate in
relation to the amount of provable losses, this raises the spectre that
something else besides the value of the underlying claims is
determining the size of the settlement. We speculate that an
unobserved variable, such as the amount of insurance coverage, may
have a strong effect on the absolute amount of damages.
We also note that, even though the market capitalization for
firms targeted in settlements yielding less than 2 percent of provable
losses is extremely large, the mean and median market capitalization
of firms yielding settlements greater than 2 percent of provable losses
when there is no SEC enforcement action, when compared with the
data in Table 4A, continues to be greater by one-third ($101.5 versus
$75.7 million)105 than the market capitalization of firms that are the
target of both SEC and private securities actions. Thus, private suits,
even disregarding the low-settlement tail, target much larger
capitalization firms than do SEC enforcement actions. The above
suggest to us that settlements against large capitalization firms
systematically reflect the prevailing norms for settlements in the
terms of the absolute amounts recovered, but ignore the fact that
larger capitalization firms naturally involve much larger provable
losses.
103. The distribution of the dollar amount of settlements is presented in Table 9A below.
The difference in medians is not statistically significant at both 5 percent and 10 percent levels
of significance.
TABLE 9A
ABSOLUTE AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENTS (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Median Mean
Recovery Less than 2 Percent Provable Loss 3.00 8.72
Recovery Greater than 2 Percent of Provable Loss 5.02 9.64
104. The correlation between these variables is around 5 percent only.
105. This economically significant difference remains statistically significant at the 10
percent level.
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To determine whether the differences in the empirical
distributions of the PLR for the two subsets (those with and those
without a parallel SEC action) are statistically significant, we
performed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.106 The results are presented in
Table 10 below.
TABLE 10
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST: COMPARING DISTRIBUTIONS OF
SETTLEMENT-AMOUNT-TO-PROVABLE-LOSSES
Hypothesis Approximate P-value
PLR (w/o SEC action) = PLR
(w/ SEC action) 0.046 (0.029)
To address our concern whether the distributions of the two
subsets are statistically distinct, we tested the hypothesis of the
equality of the distributions of these two subsets (i.e., the overall
distribution of each subset of the sample is representative of the
distribution of the other subset). The approximate p-value of this test
is 4.6 percent. We also observe that the resulting p-value is, because
of the small size of our sample, conservative. By making standard
adjustments for the sample’s size, we obtain a less conservative p-
value of 2.9 percent (reported in parenthesis in Table 10). This result
enables us to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of the
two subsets are equal at the conventional 5 percent level of
significance. That is, the distribution of PLR for cases without a
parallel SEC enforcement action is statistically significantly different
from the distribution of cases where there is no SEC action.107
106. N.V. Smirnov, Estimate of Deviation Between Empirical Distribution Functions in Two
Independent Samples, 2 BULL. MOSCOW U. 3 (1939) (in Russian). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test is a non-parametric test that tries to determine if two data sets differ significantly. See
generally JEAN DICKINSON GIBBONS, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICAL INFERENCE 84–85
(David Blackwell & Herbert Solomon eds., 1971) (applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-
sample statistic).
107. We also tested the hypothesis that the percentages for the Settlement-Amount-to-
Provable-Loss Ratio is smaller for cases for which there is no parallel SEC action than for cases
with a parallel SEC action. In other words, our null hypothesis is that the percentage PLR is
smaller for cases for which there is no parallel SEC action than for cases with a parallel SEC
action. Here we find that PLR (w/o SEC action) < PLR (w/ SEC action) yields an approximate
p-value of 0.023. As shown, the p-value for this test is 2.3 percent, thus we reject the null
hypothesis. This result does not statistically support the evident differences in the lower portion
of the distribution of the PLR that we can observe in Tables 7 and 8.
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With these results in mind, we are ready to examine empirically
what leads the SEC to file an enforcement action in a case alleging
fraud of the type that could lead to a private action. Our dependent
variable is the presence or absence of a SEC action. This variable is
coded 1 if there is a SEC enforcement action, and 0 if not. Because
the dependent variable is discontinuous, we use a Probit model in our
analysis.108
Our independent variables are defined and are included as
follows: First, we include a measure of the provable loss in the private
action. We calculate these values using the same damage model that
is discussed above.109 This is a direct measure of the size of the harm
that investors suffer as a result of the alleged fraud by the company.
We expect a higher provable loss to increase the likelihood of an
enforcement action and therefore anticipate a positive coefficient in
the Probit analysis.
The second independent variable we include is a measure of
financial distress. We utilized two alternative measures here:
Altman’s Z score110 and the change in ratio of the company’s book
This result must be understood in light of two important caveats. First, the observed p-
value is sufficiently high to suggest differences between the two subsets, but the result is not
overwhelming. Second, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is known for having lower power to
examine distributions at the tails of a sample’s distribution. GIBBONS, supra note 106, at 86.
108. Discussion of a probit model is given in any advanced econometric textbooks. See, e.g.,
GREENE, WILLIAM H., ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 849–57 (4th ed. 2000). We also considered the
use of a logit model. Both probit and logit models are designed to model the “choice” between
two discrete alternatives (in our case the dependent variable(y) is the presence(1) or absence(0)
of an SEC action). Essentially these models describe the probability that y = 1 directly, i.e.:
Prob(y=1) = F(some factors).
It follows then that Prob(y=0) = 1 – F(some factors).
Typically F is chosen to be a cumulative density function (cdf) since cdf’s by nature are
restricted to lie between zero and one. Probit and Logit models differ in their assumptions about
F: in Probit models, F is a cumulative density function of a standard normal random variable,
while in Logit models, F is a cdf of a logistic random variable.
The Logistic distribution is similar to the Normal except in the tails, so if the data is only
moderately unbalanced between 0s and 1s, the results from Probit and Logit models are very
similar; moreover, there is an approximate relation between the estimated Probit and Logit
coefficients.
In some cases, one model can be preferred over the other for computational convenience,
but it is hard to justify a distributional choice on any theoretical grounds. We could have used
Logit instead of Probit, and would have come to the same conclusions. However, just to make
sure, we checked our data and found similar results using either model. In this Article, we
present the results from the probit model.
109. See supra note 100.
110. Altman’s Z score is a commonly used measure of when a company is approaching
financial distress.
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value to market value over the time period between the filing of the
first class action complaint and the settlement of the suit. Here the
rationale is that the SEC is more likely to file enforcement actions in
situations where the firm is in financial distress because these are
more highly visible enforcement scenarios. We expect this variable to
therefore have a positive sign.
Our third independent variable is the length of time of the class
period. We include this term as a measure of the number of
defrauded investors. Our hypothesis is that when more investors are
alleged to have been defrauded, this results in a higher visibility case,
and therefore increases the likelihood that the SEC will file an
enforcement action.
Finally, we include total assets of the defendant company as an
independent variable. Here we believe that the SEC is more likely to
target smaller companies, as we saw in Tables 4 and 4A, perhaps
because these companies have weaker internal control and financial
reporting systems more likely to experience fraud, as claimed by the
Coso study mentioned above.111 Table 11 below shows our results.
TABLE 11
DETERMINANTS OF SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: DEPENDENT
VARIABLE—PRESENCE OF AN SEC INVESTIGATION
Coefficient Std.Error t-Statistic P-value
Class Period 0.021 0.014 1.470 0.142
Asset Size -0.016 0.016 -1.017 0.309
Provable
Losses/MarCap
0.008 0.011 0.763 0.446
Measure of
financial distress 0.255 0.073 3.518 0.000
Intercept -1.381 0.205 -6.748 0.000
McFadden
R-squared
7.5%
111. See supra note 98.
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Financial distress is the only variable that is significant under
ordinary measures of statistical significance. Table 11 reports the
results for the change in company book value to market value ratio.112
The significance of the financial distress measure is consistent with
the claim that the SEC is very concerned about fraud at companies
that are experiencing financial distress, probably because of the high
likelihood that investors will be harmed, and the high visibility of such
harm.
Our direct measure of investor lossesthe magnitude of
provable lossesdoes not seem to be a strong factor that motivates
the SEC to file an enforcement action. However, the length of the
class period may also proxy for the magnitude of the harm to
investors. Its positive coefficient, although only close to significant at
the 10 percent level, may suggest that the SEC still considers the
potential losses to shareholders when making its decisions.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the overlap in private class action suits and
SEC enforcement actions that arise out of violations of the federal
securities laws. We find that only about 15 percent of settled private
cases in our sample have a parallel SEC action.113 When both a SEC
and private action proceed for the same misconduct, private
recoveries are statistically larger and settled more quickly than when
there is no parallel SEC enforcement action.
We find that the SEC targets smaller capitalization issuers than
are targeted by private litigants when there is no parallel SEC
enforcement action. Indeed, the disparity in market capitalization
between the firms where there is a parallel SEC enforcement action,
and those where there is no parallel action, is not only dramatic and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but leads us to question
the social welfare implications of the SEC’s apparent preoccupation
with smaller firms and the private suit’s preoccupation with large
capitalization companies.
Recent events have demonstrated that large capitalization firms
do commit securities violations, and when they do so it has
112. We do not report the results from using the Altman’s Z score as a measure of financial
distress as they are insignificant.
113. When the inquiry is the converse, we find that 55 percent of the SEC enforcement
actions recently studied by the SEC have produced parallel private suits; it remains to be seen
whether this percentage will decline significantly when the focus is on settlement of the action.
COX.DOC 06/21/04 3:59 PM
778 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:737
devastating effects on investors. Nevertheless, an interesting data
point is that the investors’ provable losses—scaled by the firm’s
market capitalization—are not a variable that explains the “SEC’s”
choice of enforcement targets. That is, a large percentage decline
relative to the share value is not a variable associated in our database
with the likelihood of a SEC prosecution. This observation strikes us
as inconsistent with the SEC-announced practice of pursuing cases
where there are significant investor losses.
We also note that the strongest explanatory variable underlying
the SEC’s choice of its targets is the level of financial distress of the
issuer. This is consistent with the SEC-stated heuristic of minimizing
ongoing losses to investors. But the SEC’s focus on firms in financial
distress, coupled with its preoccupation with small capitalization
firms, is also consistent with the hypothesis that the SEC, at least
during the sample period, preferred weak opponents. Our disquiet is
not eased by the insignificance of investors’ provable losses as an
explanation of who becomes the target of a SEC enforcement action.
Although we have an intuitive sense that recoveries in private
actions of 20 percent or more of provable losses are “good”
recoveries, a disquieting feature of our data is that more than half of
these settlements yielded less than 10 percent of provable losses. Yet,
our comparative analysis of the distribution of the cases recovering
less than 10 percent of provable losses indicates that while there were
differences between the distributions when there was a parallel SEC
action and when there was no SEC action, the differences were not
overwhelming. Stated somewhat more directly, even when there is an
enforcement action by the SEC, the case may still yield a low
recovery relative to provable losses.
Nonetheless, the data are also consistent with the view that many
of the private suits falling within this low settlement range are little
more than small payments to rid the issuer of the nuisance and
expense of the suit. This is particularly evident when we focus on the
fact that 33 cases without a parallel SEC enforcement action settled
for less than 2 percent of provable losses, while no cases were settled
within this range when there was an SEC enforcement action. We
find more support for this dim view of private actions in our second
test of the distributions, where we observe that the distribution of
settlements when there was a SEC enforcement action are statistically
distinct from settlements not involving a parallel SEC action. This
further suggests that settlements for less than 2 percent of provable
losses do not occur when there is a parallel SEC action. Our
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confidence with identifying the outlier is underscored by our earlier
finding that settlements of cases where there has been a parallel SEC
action settled on average for a greater percentage of provable losses
than when there is no parallel SEC action.
We offer two possible non-competing explanations for what we
observe for suits recovering less than 0.02 of provable losses. Because
their resulting settlements compare favorably in absolute terms with
those of our entire sample, it may well be that settlement decisions
are guided by the amount of insurance that is available. It also may be
that what is viewed as an acceptable settlement is judged against the
absolute dollar value of settlements generally and not by the losses
suffered by the members of the class being settled.
On the other side of the settlement coin, we note that many cases
not involving a parallel SEC enforcement action settle for 20 or more
percent of provable losses. Here we have cause to find the obvious:
the SEC cannot and does not prosecute all violations and the private
suit picks up the slack. As we argued earlier, even after the enactment
of the Fair Fund provision, the SEC is not armed in most instances
with authority to recover from the wrongdoers sums equal to those
that can be recovered in private suits. Thus, even when there is a SEC
enforcement action, the private suit provides a more encompassing
remedy for the injured investors.
